Vonk, Jennifer (2018) Researchers, not dogs, lack control in an experiment on
jealousy. Animal Sentience 22(2)
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1326

Date of submission: 2018-05-15
Date of acceptance: 2018-05-17

This article has appeared in the journal Animal
Sentience, a peer-reviewed journal on animal
cognition and feeling. It has been made open access,
free for all, by WellBeing International and deposited
in the WBI Studies Repository. For more information,
please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

Animal Sentience 2018.121: Vonk on Cook et al. on Dog Jealousy

Researchers, not dogs, lack control in an experiment on jealousy
Commentary on Cook et al. on Dog Jealousy

Jennifer Vonk
Psychology Department
Oakland University
Abstract: Cook and colleagues (2018) have developed a clever method to measure fMRI in awake
dogs in response to a number of interesting stimuli. As a result, they are able to determine neural
correlates of observable behavior. They report that dogs may experience something akin to
jealousy because they show greater amygdala activation in response to food being given to a fake
dog versus food being placed in a bucket. However, several critical controls are missing which
prevent the authors from being able to speak of jealousy.
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“Dogs are our link to paradise. They don't know evil or jealousy or discontent.”
Milan Kundera

The above quote from Kundera exemplifies the most conservative assessment of dogs’ capacity
to experience emotion. On the other end of the spectrum, people routinely attribute complex
emotions to their pets. Recently developed methodology for measuring fMRI in awake canines
has been a game changer in accessing brain correlates of cognitive and behavioral processes
previously inaccessible to researchers. One longstanding question of interest to comparative
psychologists and the public alike is whether other species experience emotions similar to those
experienced by humans. There is little doubt that animals experience fear and anger – two
adaptive emotions that facilitate appropriate protective responses in the presence of threatening
stimuli. Animals’ experience of other emotions, however, is less evident. Do they experience
happiness and sadness? Animal correlates of even more complex emotions, such as shame,
disgust, pride, and jealousy may be even more difficult to ascertain. Cook and colleagues (2018)
have just published findings that suggest that dogs may experience jealousy when human
caretakers deliver food to other dogs.
Although the authors are to be commended for the methodological advances in studying
dogs’ emotional experiences, the current experiment cannot distinguish between jealousy and
other internal states. The comparison of responses to a fake dog versus a familiar neutral object
are not valid. First, a fake dog is likely to be an unfamiliar and strange object. It may well be
puzzling that it looks like a dog and yet does not smell, sound, or move like a dog. Although the
researchers took care to rub the fake dog with the scent of another dog, it is unlikely that it
emitted an odor commensurate with a real dog. In addition, the fake dog did not move, even
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when offered food, which would certainly be anomalous to observe. The subjects did not appear
to be familiarized with the fake dog before being tested in the scanner. When presented with
such an unfamiliar object, dogs are likely to be distressed and to respond as if in the presence of
a threat. The neurological response to threat or confusion may be indistinguishable from that of
jealousy. This experiment requires control conditions where fake dogs are present but not
receiving attention/affection/food from caregivers, or perhaps are receiving attention from a
stranger or disliked individual. Such controls were also lacking from a previous study that claimed
to find evidence of jealousy in dogs when human owners interacted with a stuffed dog (Harris &
Prouvost, 2014).
In addition, dogs may perceive the food that goes into a bucket as still being available,
whereas food that disappears into a fake dog may be perceived as no longer available. Thus, the
dogs may be reacting to the likelihood of being able to access the food rather than out of jealousy.
The authors acknowledge that they cannot rule out that dogs may show the same activation any
time a perceived conspecific is present. Although they argue that it would be difficult to control
the behavior of a real conspecific in the testing situation, they could present owners responding
to another human, especially a child, which might also evoke feelings of jealousy. They could also
present the fake dog in a context where it was not being “fed” or receiving attention from
humans.
In Figure 2A, it appears that there are three groups of dogs in the moderate-sized sample;
seven dogs with low dog-directed aggression scores, four dogs with intermediate scores, and two
dogs with relatively higher scores. In each of these groups, dogs were quite variable in terms of
their amygdala activation. The data appear to violate the assumption of homoscedasticity. That
is, the data points are not distributed evenly across the variable of owner-reported dog-directed
aggression. Instead, more than half of the data points are at the low end, with owners essentially
reporting no aggression for these dogs. Thus, I am also skeptical about the reported relationship
between dog-directed aggression scores and amygdala activation.
At a conceptual level, it is likely that being upset over losing a physical resource to another
evokes a different emotional response, even in humans, compared to the kind of upset one
experiences when one loses the attention or affection of another with whom one has a strong
emotional bond. Is it still jealousy when one is upset by the loss of a valuable resource? It is
unclear whether the neurological response measured here represents jealousy or arousal or
irritation or surprise. Psychologists should take great care to define emotions operationally and
use these definitions in a consistent and rigorous manner without using sensationalistic
terminology to attract attention to what are otherwise provocative findings. Emotions are
challenging enough to study without introducing confusion at the conceptual level.

References
Cook, P., Prichard, A., Spivak, M., & Berns, G. S. (2018). Jealousy in dogs? Evidence from brain
imaging. Animal Sentience 22(1).
Harris, C. R., & Prouvost, C. (2014). Jealousy in dogs. PLoS ONE 9(7): e94597.

2

UQÀM/ISC Cognitive Science Summer School June 26 - July 6 2018, Montreal, Canada

The Other Minds Problem: Animal Sentience and Cognition
Overview. Since Descartes, philosophers know there is no way to know for sure what — or whether — others
feel (not even if they tell you). Science, however, is not about certainty but about probability and evidence. The
7.5 billion individual members of the human species can tell us what they are feeling. But there are 9 million
other species on the planet (20 quintillion individuals), from elephants to jellyfish to mammals, with which
humans share biological and cognitive ancestry, but not one other species can speak: Which of them can feel —
and what do they feel? Their human spokespersons — the comparative psychologists, ethologists, evolutionists,
and cognitive neurobiologists who are the world’s leading experts in “mind-reading" other species -- will provide
a sweeping panorama of what it feels like to be an elephant, ape, whale, cow, pig, dog, chicken, mouse, fish, lizard,
lobster, snail: This growing body of facts about nonhuman sentience has profound implications not only for our
understanding of human cognition, but for our treatment of other sentient species.
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